6.2 Anthropomorphism in Emotion Research

Anthropomorphism is the (mis)attribution of human capabilities and emotions to other species. Since B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) first championed behaviorism, comparative psychologists and ethologists have been warned against anthropomorphism of their study species. However, the warning against exaggerating other species’ capabilities dates to René Descartes’s (1596-1650) denial that animals held reason or intelligence.

Yet, while studying natural adaptation, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) argued for evolutionary continuity in the mind, as well as the body. In 1872, he published The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, building a logical and evidence based defense of his viewpoint. Here he spoke of behaviors and emotional expressions being adaptive, and as a result, becoming a reflex in future generations. Looking at common behaviors like crying in young animals and infants, as well as fearful reactions like raised hair on his dogs’ backs, Darwin began to synthesize his main point – that we are all alike in variations of degrees.

Despite Darwin’s own writings, many modern scholars continue to make two crucial errors:

  1. Assuming humans are the standard to which all other species should be measured, and
  2. Assuming other species do not have a capacity until we find a way to unequivocally show they do.

Among cognitive evolution researchers, the counterpoint to these assumptions goes “Evolution does not stop at the neck.”

Benefits of Anthropomorphism

To understand anthropomorphism and consider its value, let’s step back a moment. When we see another person and determine they are happy, sad, angry, joyful, how do we know? Of course, we can ask them what they are feeling, but it is common knowledge that people can lie.

To some extent, we are anthropomorphic with our own species. We see an expression or hear a wail and interpret it based upon our own behavioral expressions. This is easy for us to do with other humans because we spent our lives growing up and learning to perceive others (ontogeny). Yet, sometimes, even with humans we get it wrong.

Anthropomorphism is a starting point to seeing other animals as sentient, emotional agents within their world. It can help us feel empathy for a whale who lost her calf, and it can help us revel in the joy of playing with a dog. By seeing other species as capable of thought and emotion, we open the door to understand their experience of the world.

Negatives of Anthropomorphism

Of course, it is possible to go too far. And it this misinterpretation that so many cognitive scientists are attempting to avoid. Much like we do not want to assume a species is not capable of a human emotion, we also do not want to assume other species have human motivations or intentions. This became incredibly important during the early 2000s when canine cognition expert, Alexandra Horowitz, published a study on the “guilty look” in dogs. Initially a silent release, the paper quickly became salient in response to the now famous “Denver the Guilty Dog” went viral.

Testing 14 dogs, owners gave their dogs a command to not eat a treat left on a table in the room. After leaving the room, researchers removed the treat from the table. Owners were either told “your dog ate the treat” or “your dog did not eat the treat.” Horowitz found that whether or not the dog actually ate the treat was not associated with the “guilty” look. However, whether or not the owner thought the dog was guilty and entered the room accordingly (usually disappointed or scolding tone) had a large impact. Here is an example of anthropomorphism gone awry and impacting the welfare of dogs and their humans.

 

A wolf lies in the grass with his mouth open.
What do you see in the above picture of a wolf? Click here for the answer.

Anthropomorphism is Just a Tool

Ultimately, anthropomorphism is simply a tool – no more, no less. It can be used well to hypothesize about another’s experience, and it can allow us to make assumptions that can harm other species. So, how do we use it well?

To start, we must learn what is already known about a species. Whether reading a book about dogs to better understand a canine in the home or spending months reading about a chimpanzee in order to study them in Africa, having a baseline of knowledge helps us use any tool more effectively.

We must also be wary of our assumptions. It is anthropocentric to assume other species have no emotion, but it is anthropomorphic to assume their emotional lives are exactly like ours. Rather, we can begin to ask, “what does love look like?” then see if it looks the same in other species.

There are many ways to do this. Gregory Berns of Emory University began training dogs to voluntarily enter an fMRI machine. This was one of the first studies ever to attempt to obtain awake fMRI images from a species other than humans. This all began with the question, “does my dog love me?”

What Berns and his team found, was that the brain region associated with reward (and love) in humans was the same brain region activated when dogs smelled their guardian’s shirt. Being careful not to anthropomorphize, Berns instead argued that his study suggested a reward-response is more common for a familiar human when compared to conspecifics (other dogs). Essentially, dogs prefer people they know and are rewarded by their presence – not unlike love.

Using anthropomorphism can help us begin to ask new questions that no longer assume other species do not have emotions or reason. Instead, we can begin to think about the evolutionary niche of each species in turn and ask, “what cognitive skills or emotional traits would be adaptive for this species?” By operationalizing the abstract concepts we seek to understand, we provide a foundation for research into the minds of other species – and our own.

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Introduction to Evolution & Human Behavior Copyright © 2022 by Shelly Volsche, PhD is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License, except where otherwise noted.

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